Between Memory and Identity: Trauma and the Self in Islamic Philosophy

Mona Jahangiri (University of Göttingen)

This post looks at the ethical questions around “memory dampening”, a process that uses medication to lessen the impact of traumatic memories. It explores whether changing memories affects who we are and if negative experiences are important for our identity. Drawing on the ideas of 17th-century Islamic philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā, it offers an Islamic perspective on the deeper ethical and philosophical issues of memory modification.

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Memory-dampening drugs

In a recent article, Muhammad Faruque and I explore the ethical concerns surrounding memory-dampening drugs like propranolol from an Islamic philosophical perspective. These drugs, originally developed to help people with PTSD by reducing the emotional intensity of traumatic memories, raise deeper questions about identity, personal growth, and the value of painful experiences.

While memory modification technologies (MMTs) offer relief by softening distressing memories, they also come with risks. If used beyond medical treatment, they could weaken personal identity, erase important life lessons, or even be misused—such as covering up crimes or manipulating public perception. For instance, propranolol may lessen the emotional charge of memories without erasing them, but newer technologies like U0126 could have more profound effects.

Beyond the individual, MMTs also raise social and ethical questions. Could they widen the gap between those who can afford to “edit” their memories and those who cannot? Would removing painful experiences hinder emotional and spiritual growth? Islamic philosophy suggests that hardships play a role in shaping character and moral development, making memory an essential part of personal and ethical integrity.

This discussion ultimately asks:

Should memory-dampening technologies be used outside of medical treatment? And if so, how do we ensure they serve human well-being rather than harm it?

Selfhood and Personal Identity in Islamic Philosophy

Mullā Ṣadrā, a prominent 17th-century Persian philosopher, is best known for founding the school of Transcendent Theosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya), which emphasizes the primacy of being (aṣālat al-wujūd). His insights into selfhood and trauma are deeply rooted in this metaphysical framework, where existence precedes essence, with being itself as the foundational reality. His doctrine aligns with the Sufi concept of the unity of being (waḥdat al-wujūd), where all beings derive their existence from God, the Absolute Being. This framework informs his views on the nature of reality and personal identity.

Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy sees everything, including humans, as constantly evolving from potential to actual being. The soul develops through different stages—sensory perception, imagination, and intellect—meaning personal identity isn’t fixed but continuously changes. Unlike other beings with a set identity, humans grow and transform, taking on different forms at each stage of their existence.

This means the self is flexible and can take on different identities depending on a person’s experiences, abilities, and choices in life.

Mullā Ṣadrā highlights the power of imagination and reflection in shaping personal identity. He sees imagination as essential to how we understand ourselves and the world, building on ideas from Sufi thought. His concept of “contiguous imagination” suggests that imagination is deeply connected to reality, influencing the way we perceive and develop our sense of self.

In this sense, a person’s identity formation is basically in a state of flow in which it cannot stop itself. There is a transformation into something at every moment. Human beings cannot change this flow, but they can influence its direction. Thus, one cannot separate the identity of a person from the person herself. To give an example, one could say that it corresponds to the relationship between the carpet and the pattern on the carpet.

The fact that, for Mullā Ṣadrā, the imagination is something conjoined means that, in the relationship between human beings and their imagination, the following notion is valid: their existence is equal to their creation. If the self desires something, the imagination already arises, so there is a direct connection. It is like the relationship between human beings and their shadow. The soul has a conjoined (ittiṣāl) relationship with its imaginations. Our imaginations do not have an existence separate from ourselves. They are not identical to us, but they are not completely separate from us either. He further says that whatever one imagines is exactly identical with oneself.

Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, identity is changeable in the course of life and does not remain the same. So, human beings have the task of creating their own indeterminate identity in this world.

Mullā Ṣadrā’s view on Memory and forgetfulness

For Mullā Ṣadrā, memory is a faculty that enables us to fix and store the data taken in by the senses and to use them when needed. According to his theory, all physical entities are constantly in motion.

It is crucial to highlight that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s framework, forgetfulness or Alzheimer’s disease is denoted by nisyān or sometimes as dhuhūl. Here, nisyān is interpreted as a lasting form of forgetfulness, while dhuhūl pertains to a temporary lapse in memory. The term nisyān is the act of forgetting a fact that was previously remembered. Whereas dhuhūl, means carelessness or inattention.

Nisyān also has an aspect which arises from a change in the self, wherein the individual is no longer able to connect with the active intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl). The distinction between nisyān and dhuhūl lies in the fact that in dhuhūl, the self retains the ability over imaginary images without the necessity of acquiring a new sensation. In contrast, with nisyān, a new sensation is required. In the case of dhuhūl, the imagination or visualization of images occur, whereas with nisyān, this does not take place because nisyān is brought about through a shift or change in the forces of perception.

For memory and recollection, it is necessary to be able to visualize an image. In both cases, however, whether it is the imagination or sense perception, the goal is the attainment of forms. In dhuhūl, the search for image involves one of these aspects, whereas in nisyān, images arise in both the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak and the faculty of imagination (al-quwwa al-khayāliyya).

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical framework, nisyān and dhuhūl do not always denote a pathological state like Alzheimer’s disease. Rather, forgetfulness is understood within his larger metaphysical and epistemological system, where knowledge and memory are deeply tied to the gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd).

Mullā Ṣadrā sees memory loss as more than just brain damage—it’s part of the soul’s journey. While science explains forgetfulness through changes in the brain, he views it as a shift in our connection to deeper levels of existence. Thus, Mullā Ṣadrā might see Alzheimer’s as an ontological veiling—where the soul's connection to certain knowledge or its capacity for growth is diminished.

Concluding Reflections

Unlike philosopher John Locke, Mullā Ṣadrā sees personal identity as more than just memories or consciousness. He believes identity is rooted in human essence and shaped by habits, imagination, and actions. Following Suhrawardī and Avicenna, he emphasizes non-reflective consciousness—an ever-present awareness that goes beyond thoughts and experiences. Because of this, memory dampening would not erase identity, as selfhood exists beyond just reflective awareness.

The initial question was whether taking memory-dampening drugs in order to forget trauma or bad memories would change the personal identity from the viewpoint of Mullā Ṣadrā. Having explained his perspective that there is no fixed personal identity, the response to this question would be: no, it would not change the person’s identity.

In simple terms, Islamic philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā sees identity as deeper than just memory or consciousness, unlike thinkers like Locke or Derek Parfit. He believes in different levels of selfhood, including non-reflective consciousness—a constant, unchanging part of who we are. This means that memory-dampening drugs might reduce the emotional impact of memories but wouldn’t change a person’s core identity. In contrast, materialist views see identity as tied to the brain, making it easier to accept drugs as tools for happiness and relief from suffering.

From Mullā Ṣadrā’s standpoint, such drugs are not necessary, though their usage is not rejected when really needed. This last point is worth emphasizing since there might be circumstantial reasons which might necessitate the use of memory-dampening drugs. That is to say. Mullā Ṣadra’s perspective leaves the door open to various possibilities while prioritizing self-development and spiritual growth.

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The above is a summary of ideas from: Jahangiri, M., Faruque, M.U. Toward a Neuro-ethics in Islamic Philosophy: Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity. SOPHIA 63, 755–774 (2024).

Mona Jahangiri is a postdoc and an associate member of the Seminar for Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Göttingen